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This Article explores the difficulties of invoking state responsibility for
the commission of a wrongful act in breach of international human rights
law, by examining the legal issues raised by the U.S. "extraordinary
rendition" program. Extraordinary rendition usually involves the seizure
of a terror suspect in a foreign state, from which the person is "spirited
away" to a state sponsor of torture, to be subjected to brutal interrogation
techniques by the security apparatus of that state. It constitutes a clear
breach of non-refoulement provisions contained in several international
treaties, as well a breach of the non-derogablejus cogens and erga omnes
prohibition oftorture under customary international law. Although the acts
of torture are undertaken by the receiving state, the act of rendering a
suspect to torture, conducted by a special unit of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), is attributable to the United States. The receipt of
"diplomatic assurances" that rendered persons will not be tortured in their
destination state-in the light of clear evidence that torture does
occur--does not obviate responsibility; nor do the doctrines of necessity
and self-defense. Despite the clarity of the breach, several obstacles
prevent states or individuals from holding the United States responsible.
Procedural constraints, especially standing, pose difficulties in the
extraordinary rendition context. The author also comments that a lack of
political will has prevented her home country of Australia from taking
action as an "injured state." This Article concludes that the secondary rules
contained in the International Law Commission's Articles on State
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Responsibility (ILC Articles)' have not yet "connected" with the primary
obligations of human rights, with worrying connotations in a future where
states will have greater opportunities to obfuscate responsibility for
international wrongs by engaging in proxy human rights breaches.
"If you want a serious interrogation, you send a prisoner to Jordan. If you
want them to be tortured you send them to Syria. If you want someone to
disappear-never to see them again-you send them to Egypt."2
I. INTRODUCTION

In 2005, Khaled El-Masri, a German citizen of Lebanese descent,
brought a complaint against George Tenet and several security contractors
that he alleges were involved in his forcible abduction, incommunicado
detention, beating, drugging, and transportation to a secret prison in
Afghanistan, where he was subjected to inhumane conditions and coercive
interrogation.3 He claims to be a victim of the alleged U.S. practice of
"extraordinary rendition": the transfer of terror suspects by U.S. security
forces to third states known to engage in torture, where they are
surrendered to local security forces.4 The purported purpose of
extraordinary rendition is to enable the United States to subject terrorism

1. Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Aug. 9, 2001
[hereinafter ILC Articles], availableathttp://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft/20
articles/9 6 2001 .pdf. Although the ILC Articles do not have the binding status of a treaty, many
of its provisions are declaratory of customary international law. An international court will rely
heavily upon its provisions when it finds it appropriate to do so. See Ian Brownlie, State
Responsibility andthe InternationalCourt ofJustice, in ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTION 11, 12 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Dan Sarooshi eds., 2004)
[hereinafter ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY]. The ICJ in the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion
referred to them in relation to the test of necessity. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, 194-95 (July 9).
2. Bob Baer, a former covert agent who worked for the CIA in the Middle East, quoted in
Ruth Jamieson & Kieran McEvoy, State Crime by Proxy & Juridical Othering, 45 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 504, 516 (2005).
3. See ACLU.org, Extraordinary Rendition, http://www.chrgj.org/docs/TortureByProxy.pdf
(last visited Dec. 31, 2007). For more examples of extraordinary rendition, see Ass'N OF THE BAR
OF THE CITY OF N.Y. & CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. & GLOBAL JUST., TORTURE BY PROXY: INT'L &
DOMESTIC LAW APPLICABLE TO "EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS" 12 (2004) [hereinafter TORTURE

BY PROXY], availableat http://www.nyuhr.org/docs/TortureByProxy.pdf.
4. Complaint 7, EI-Masri v. Tenet, No. 1:05cv1417 (U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia), available at http://www.aclu.org/images/extraordinaryrendition/asset_
uploadfile829_2221 l.pdf.
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suspects to the more "effective" modes of interrogation practiced by
receiving states.
Rendition to torture is a contemporary example of "a longstanding
strategy for evasion of responsibility for actions carried out in pursuance
of [a state's] 'organizational goals"' 5 involving placing distance between
the state and the actors personally carrying out an illegal activity on its
behalf.6 It involves the "othering" of the victims of international wrongs
by placing them territorially and conceptually beyond the jurisdiction of
local courts, and the "othering" of perpetrators themselves, by giving the
task of removing suspects to a special unit of the CIA, which enjoys a high
level of operational and bureaucratic privilege, and by cooperating with
security apparati of obliging third states. Its key aim appears to be to
obfuscate U.S. responsibility for acts of torture that it facilitates, which are
carried out at its direction and on its behalf. For this very reason, this
Article seeks to evaluate the prospects for the invocation of state
responsibility in respect of this conduct. In this context, obtaining a "freestanding finding of State responsibility"7 (a finding of state responsibility
by an international forum which is significant in its own right, independent
of a remedy) is vital, in order to clearly demonstrate to the United States
and to the rest of the world that accountability for fundamental human
rights obligations cannot be circumvented by "othering" the actors.
After briefly introducing the practice of extraordinary rendition, this
Article will apply the general principles of state responsibility, as
enunciated in international cases and embodied in the International Law
Commission's Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally
Wrongful Acts,8 which were adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations on 12 December 2001,' to the problem of extraordinary
rendition. We will see that extraordinary rendition is an internationally
wrongful act, which constitutes a breach of the U.S.'s international
obligations under the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)' ° and other
treaties." However, there are almost insurmountable practical and
5. Jamieson & McEvoy, supranote 2, at 504.
6. Id. at 504-05.
7. For a discussion of when it is appropriate to seek a free-standing finding of state
responsibility, see Rosalyn Higgins, Issues of State ResponsibilityBefore the InternationalCourt
of Justice, in ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 7-8.
8. ILC Articles, supra note 1.
9. G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001).
10. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1988 U.S.T. Lexis 202, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
11. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 1996 U.S.T. Lexis
521, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July
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procedural challenges faced by a state or individual wishing to invoke state
responsibility in this situation. This leads us to reflect on whether the ILC
Articles really "facilitate the holding to account of those who are
responsible for breaching international obligations," 2 particularly
international human rights obligations.
II. THE PRACTICE OF EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION
The term "extraordinary rendition" is used to refer to the transfer of an
individual to a foreign state, where there are grounds to believe that the
transferee may be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment in that state. Recent reports indicate that the United States and
its agents have removed persons suspected of being linked to Islamic terror
organizations to recipient states including Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia,
Jordan, and Morocco, each of which has been noted by the State
Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practicesto engage in
the torture of detainees by security and police forces.' 3 Extraordinary
renditions are also known to have been carried out by states other than the
United States,14 but only the United States could be said to have aprogram
of extraordinary rendition. This Article will focus on the United States, but
much of the discussion will obviously be relevant to any state which
renders a person to torture.
Commentators believe that renditions are motivated on two fronts: to
avoid granting terror suspects access to American courts, where they
28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; Convention
Relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
[hereinafter Geneva III]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 6 U.N.T.S. 3365 [hereinafter Geneva IV]; American
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR].
12. Malcolm D. Evans, State Responsibilityand the EuropeanConvention on Human Rights:
Role and Realm, in ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 139, 140.
13. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2003 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
(2004) [hereinafter 2003 Country Reports], availableat http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rlsIhrrpt/2003/
(last visited Apr. 9, 2007); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2004 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES (2005) [hereinafter 2004 Country Reports], availableat http://www.state.gov/
g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2007).
14. According to Human Rights Watch, various states other than the United States have
rendered security suspects to Egypt. Human Rights Watch, Empty Promises: Diplomatic
Assurances No Safeguard Against Torture, 16 HuM. RTS. WATCH, Apr. 2004, at 1 [hereinafter
H.R.W. Report 1], available at www.hrw.org/reports/2004/un0404/diplomatic0404.pdf; Human
Rights Watch, Still at Risk: DiplomaticAssurancesNo SafeguardAgainstTorture, 17 HUM. RTS.
WATCH, Apr. 2005, at 1 [hereinafter H.R.W. Report 2], availableat http://hrw.org/reports/2005
/eca04O5/.
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would be afforded due process 5 (i.e., to "other" the victim), and to enlist
foreign institutions to extract answers from them by brutal methods that
American interrogators dare not use (i.e., to "other" the perpetrator). 6 The
United States has been reported to provide a list of questions they want
answered when handing over suspects and to accept intelligence from
these countries. 7 The CAT Article 15 explicitly prohibits this ("Each State
Party shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been
made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any
proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that
the statement was made"),'" but the United States has not implemented
Article 15 domestically, and the U. S. District Court has supported the view
that it is not judicially enforceable.' 9
The practice of extraordinary rendition, which has been dubbed
"outsourcing torture"2 and "torture by proxy,"'" forms a less well known
15. "[T]he C.I.A. was wary of granting terrorism suspects the due process afforded by
American law. The agency did not want to divulge secrets about its intelligence sources and
methods, and American courts demand transparency." Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The
Secret History ofAmerica's "ExtraordinaryRendition" Program,NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005,
availableat http://www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/050214fa-fact6.
16. Center for Human Rights and Global Justice New York University School of Law,
Torture by Proxy: International Law Applicable to "Extraordinary Renditions" (Briefing to the All
Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition), at 6, availableat http://www.chrgj.org/
docs/APPG-NYU%20Briefing%20Paper.pdf.
17. Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Turns to Torture to Crack Prisoners of War,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Dec. 27, 2002, at http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/12/26/
1040511135568.html?oneclick=true (last visited Apr. 26, 2005).
18. CAT, art. 5.
19. Evidence obtained by torture was admitted ina 1991 district court case, and went towards
supporting an extradition order against an Israeli citizen accused of trafficking heroine in Turkey.
See James Park Taylor, Law in the Age of Terrorism, Dancing with the Scavenger's Daughter:
Torture, Rendition of the United States, MONT. LAW., June/July 2005, available at http://
www.montanabar.org/montanalawyer/junejuly2005/torture.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2007).
Evidence obtained by torture may be admissible in a criminal trial in light of the case of American
citizen Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, who has been indicted in the U.S. District Court to face terrorist
charges. The Court refused to disallow a confession allegedly obtained through harsh interrogation
tactics (and arguably torture) in a Saudi Arabian prison in criminal proceedings against Ali, who
was ultimately found guilty of terrorism charges. BBC News, US. Man Guilty ofBush DeathPlot,
Nov. 22, 2005, athttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4461642.stm (last visited Apr. 9,2007). The
British Court of Appeal has held that evidence gathered by a third state pursuant to this
arrangement may be admissible in special cases to try suspected terrorists, so long as the
government can show that it neither procured nor connived at the torture. A, B, C, D, E,F,G,H,
Mahmoud Abu Rideh Jamal Ajouaou v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] EWCA (Civ.)
1123, [539] (Eng.). 1123.
20. Press Release, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (CHRGJ) at New York
University School of Law, Congress Must Take Immediate Action to Stop Outsourcing Torture
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technique justified by the "new paradigm, ' 22 a moniker chosen by the U.S.
Administration to refer to the special rules it suggests apply to the "new
kind of war" it intends to wage in the wake of the September 11 attacks.
The new paradigm, it is argued, renders obsolete the rules of war contained
in the Geneva Conventions. 23 According to Gaita, the new paradigm is a
unilaterally conceived model, used by the United States to attempt to
justify a legally dubious, results-oriented program of detention and
24
interrogation which "no one would have dreamt of publicly defending"
before September 11.21 Other techniques include the direct use of coercive
interrogation by U.S. civilian officers, which under international law
would arguably constitute torture.26 The transferal of suspects to special
detention centers under U.S. control but outside the reach of domestic
courts is another new paradigm technique.
Extraordinary renditions are different from "rendition to justice,, 27 a
practice developed in the late 1980s whereby the CIA or FBI personnel,
authorized by presidential directions, 28 apprehend individuals in states
ravaged by civil war, such as Lebanon, and transfer them to states with an
interest in trying them. 29 Rendition to justice is the cousin of extradition,
without the formal procedures. The element of torture and cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment is what sets extraordinary rendition apart from
rendition to justice, as well as the fact that extraordinary renditions are off-

(Feb. 22, 2005) [hereinafter CHRGJ], available at http://www.nyuhr.org/docs/050221 %20press
%20release%20final.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2007).
21. TORTURE BY PROXY, supra note 3.
22. This is the term used by then presidential lawyer Alberto Gonzales as a response to
terrorism, which is a "new kind of war" in Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales on the Decision
Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and
the Taliban to the President of the United States (Jan. 25, 2002).
23. Id.
24. Raimond Gaita, quoted in Jessica Howard, Book Review, The Torture Papers:the Road
to Abu Ghraib, Edited by Karen Greenberg & Joshua Dratel (New York, US.: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 6 MELB. J. INT'L L. 189, 202 (2005).

25. See Howard,supranote 24, at 197. Howard relays how the Gonzales memo bypasses any
discussion of the possible restraints international law may place on the retaliatory or preemptive
conduct.
26. Recently debate has centered on whether the practice known as waterboarding constitutes
torture. See Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, CIA 's Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described,
ABC NEWS, Nov. 18, 2005, available at http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Investigation/story?id=

1322866.
27. TORTURE BY PROXY, supranote 3, at 15.
28. See id.
at 13.
29. Id.at 15.
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the-record.3" Khaled El-Masri's case, mentioned in the introduction, is
typical. A similar story is told by Canadian citizen Maher Arar, who says
he was seized by American officials in JFK Airport while in transit to
Canada and deported to Syria.3 1 Despite diplomatic assurances from Syria
that he would not be harmed, he reported after his release that during his
ten-month detention he was subjected to beatings and threatened with
electric shocks.32
It is not known how many extraordinary renditions have taken place,
but former CIA director George Tenet indicated to the 9/11 Commission
that over 70 renditions occurred before the September 11 attacks. 33 The
CIA has refused to reveal how many extraordinary renditions have taken
place since 9/11, but sources have been quoted as saying that renditions
are a "routine" occurrence.3 4 Researcher Scott Horton estimates that the
number is about 150. 3' The U.S. President and government officials have
categorically denied that it takes place at all.3 6 This Article will avoid
speculation about the veracity of the allegations, and assuming the practice
of extraordinary rendition exists, will instead examine its possible
significance of international law.
III. EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION IS AN INTERNATIONALLY
WRONGFUL ACT

Article 1 of the JILC Articles provides that "[e]very internationally
wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that
State., 37 Establishing that an act or omission is "an internationally
wrongful act" involves showing that it "constitutes a breach of an
international obligation of the State," and "is attributable to the State under

30. Id. at4, 15.
31. Complaint 1, Arar v. Ashcroft, No. CV-04-0249 (U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District ofNew York), availableat http://www.maherarar.ca/cms/images/uploads/ArarComplaint
FINAL.pdf.
32. Mayer, supranote 15.
33. 19 CONG. REC. E282 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 2005) (Edward Markey's Introduction of "The
Torture Outsourcing Prevention Act").
34. CNN.com, Italy Seeks 6 More Arrests in CIA Case, at http://edition.cnn.com/2005/
WORLD/europe/07/25/cia.italy/index.htnl (last visited Apr. 9, 2007).
35. Mayer, supra note 15.
36. Then White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales wrote in a letter to the Washington Post
that "(c)onsistent with [CAT], the United States does not expel, return or extradite individuals to
countries where the United States believes it is likely that they will be tortured." Alberto Gonzales,
The President'sStance on Torture,WASH. POST,Oct. 5, 2004, at A24.
37. ILC Articles, supra note 1, art. 1.
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international law."3 The existence of a wrongful act gives rise to a right
to hold a state responsible, but this right is not self-executing; it needs to
be taken up on behalf of the injured party. As we will see later in this
Article, implementing state responsibility poses the greatest challenge in
the extraordinary rendition context. Nonetheless, it is logical to first
explore the wrongfulness of the practice under the U.S. international legal
obligations before turning to how state responsibility might operate in
practice.
A. ExtraordinaryRendition Constitutesa Breach of the U.S. 's
InternationalObligations
A wide range of potential legal issues are raised by extraordinary
rendition. A special report prepared by the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York and New York University's Center for Human Rights
and Global Justice argues that extraordinary renditions constitute three
wrongs allied to the prohibition on torture: (i) refoulement of an individual
to a state where they may be subject to torture; (ii) complicity to torture;
and (iii) failure to prevent or remedy torture.39 Other potential legal issues
may arise, such as whether the forced removal of an individual from
another state without its permission can constitute a breach of that state's
sovereignty.4" It is also likely that extensive denial of justice occurs when
aliens are detained incommunicado for excessively long periods, without
access to a lawyer or without having formal charges laid against them.4 1
The failure to prevent extraordinary renditions potentially represents a
failure of due diligence on the part of the state from which the individual
disappears. 42 For the sake of brevity, this Article will focus only on the
breach of the non-refoulement U.S. obligations as a basis for discussing
international responsibility.

38. Id. art. 2.
39. TORTURE BY PROXY, supra note 3, at 92-93.
40. This issue was raised in Italian Parliament Motion for hearing 3-01973 introduced by
Cesare Salvi on 17 February 2005, session no. 743 (unofficial translation on file with the Center
for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York University School of Law).
41.

See ALwYN V. FREEMAN, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL OF

113-14, 201, 203, 206-07, 213 (1938).
42. See Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, at 30 (July 29,
1988) (holding that the government of Honduras's failure to prevent or even respond to the
disappearances of individuals in breach of their human rights was found to have constituted a lack
of due diligence, even when the disappearances were not carried out by the government.
JUSTICE
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1. Torture is a Breach of International Law
The general international law prohibition on acts of torture is an erga
omnes norm, and as such is owed to the international community and
enforceable by any state.43 It has attained the status of jus cogens in
customary international law,' and is thus binding on all states, regardless
of whether they are party to a treaty prohibiting torture. It is also embodied
in multilateral treaties, notably Article 2 of the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
1984 (CAT) and Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).45
As mentioned above, there is the issue of whether the United States
could bear imputed responsibility under ILC Articles 16 and 17 for acts of
torture it facilitates but does not itself commit.4 6 The prohibition also gives
rise to concomitant obligations, including the obligation not to transfer
someone to a country where they may be subject to torture.47
2. Extraordinary Rendition is a Breach of the NonRefoulement Obligation
a. CAT
The widest protection against rendition to torture to which the United
States is subject is contained in Article 3 of CAT, which provides that
"[n]o State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he
would be in danger of being subjected to torture."4' A decision that there
are substantial grounds for such a belief is made taking into account all
relevant circumstances, both objective (the receiving state displays "a
consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights"4' 9 )

43. M. CherifBassiouni, InternationalCrimes: Jus Cogens and ObligatioErga Omnes, 59
LAw& CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 72-73 (1996); Robert K. Goldman, Trivializing Torture: The Office
of Legal Counsel's 2002 Opinion Letter and InternationalLaw Against Torture, 12 HuM. RTS.
BRJEF 1, 1 (2004).
44. Bassiouni, supra note 43, at 72 n.46; Goldman, supranote 43, at 1.
45. See also Geneva III, supranote 11, arts. 13 & 17; Geneva IV, supra note 11, arts. 31 &
32.
46. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Mark Gibney et al., TransnationalState
Responsibilityfor Violations of Human Rights, 12 HARV. HuM. RTs. J. 267 (1999).
47. ILC Articles, supra note 1, arts. 16-17.
48. CAT, supra note 10, art. 3.
49. Id.
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and subjective ("whether the individual concerned would be personally at
risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he would
return"").
Rendition to torture would in many cases breach Article 3.5 The
recipient states of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco are
known by the United States to exhibit a systematic pattern of torture by the
security forces,52 thereby satisfying the objective criterion. The question
of whether an individual is personally at risk of being subjected to torture
upon transfer has been elaborated on by the Committee Against Torture
(CAT Committee). In its General Comment 1, the CAT Committee stated
that a person was personally at risk when he/she was engaged in activities
"within or outside the State concerned which would appear to make
him/her particularly vulnerable to the risk of being placed in danger of
torture were he/she to be expelled, returned or extradited to the State in
question. 5 3 Given that Egypt is known by the United States to be using
violent methods in its crackdown on Islamic terrorism, 4 the logical
conclusion is that persons suspected of engaging in Islamic terrorist
activities or being connected to terrorist groups, are "particularly
vulnerable" to the risk of torture upon transferal.
There are certainly reasonable grounds for believing that there is the
danger of torture, but do they constitute "substantial grounds" for the
belief? According to former Department of Justice lawyer Martin
Lederman, "[t]he Convention only applies when you know a suspect is
more likely than not to be tortured. . . ."" This is a misreading of the
provisions of CAT. For there to be an Article 3 breach,56 it is not necessary
that torture in fact takes place in the recipient state. Nor is it even
necessary that torture would be the most probable outcome. The CAT
Committee has made it clear that it is enough that the risk of torture is

50. S.U.A. v. Sweden, Communication No. 223/2002 6.3, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/33/D/223/
2002(2004), availableathttp://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cat/decisions/223-2002.html (last visited
Apr. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Communication No. 223].
51. CAT, supra note 10, art. 3.
52. 2004 Country Reports, supranote 13.
53. COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, GENERAL COMMENT 1, COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING
THE RETURN OF A PERSON TO A STATE WHERE THERE MAY BE GROUNDS HE WOULD BE SUBJECTED
TO TORTURE (ARTICLE 3 IN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 22), U.N. Doc. A/53/44, annex IX, at 52,
8 (1998), reprintedin COMPILATIONS OF GENERAL COMMENTS AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
ADOPTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.6 at 279 (2003).

54. See Mayer, supranote 15.
55. Id.
56. CAT, supra note 10, art. 3.
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more than "mere theory or suspicion."57 Contrary to Lederman's assertion,
when a Government "kind of know[s] 5 8 that a suspect may be tortured,
this is sufficient knowledge.
Furthermore, if domestic law sets up a different test of knowledge, this
does not affect the character of an "internationally wrongful act." Under
ILC Article 3, the characterization of an act of a state as wrongful under
international law "is not affected by the characterization of the same act
as lawful by internal law."5 9 Therefore, the narrower test of knowledge in
a proposed section 3032 in the 9/11 RecommendationsImplementationAct
of 2004,60 which would have required an applicant to provide "clear and
convincing evidence" of the risk of torture,6' would not have altered the
wrongfulness of the transfer of a detainee under international law. In
situations where knowledge falls short of clear and convincing evidence
of the risk of torture, CAT may still be breached.
b. Other Sources of Non-Refoulement Obligations
Extraordinary renditions are likely to be caught by the indirect
prohibition on refoulement to torture in the ICCPR.6 2 Its scope is slightly
narrower than that of Article 3 of CAT, because it requires "substantial
grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm" through
torture,6 3 before the prohibition is invoked. The United States is subject to
similar obligations under Article 33 of the Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees' (Refugee Convention), but this prohibition is not
57. Communication No. 223, supra note 50.
58. Mayer, supra note 15.
59. See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (according to which a State Party "may not invoke the provisions of its internal law
as justification for its failure to perform a treaty").
60. H.R. Res. 10, 108th Cong. § 3032 (2004) (enacted).
61. 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act, H.R. 10, 108th Cong. § 3032(a)(3) (2004).
62. This prohibition is derived from the prohibition of torture. ICCPR, supra note 11, arts.
2 & 7. See HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, GENERAL COMMENT No. 20, ARTICLE 7, U.N. Doc.
A/47/40 (1992) reprinted in COMPILATION OF GENERAL COMMENTS AND GENERAL
RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev. 1
at 30 (1994) [hereinafter HRC GENERAL COMMENT 20], cited in TORTURE BY PROXY, supra note
3, at 54; HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, GENERAL COMMENT No. 31, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13,
Mar. 26, 2004 (adopted on Mar. 29, 2004) [hereinafter HRC GENERAL COMMENT 31].
63. HRC GENERAL COMMENT 31, supra note 62, 12.
64. Article 33 provides that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social ground
or political opinion." Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adoptedApr. 22, 1954, 189
U.N.T.S. 150.
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absolute. 65 The United States is also a signatory to the Inter-American
Torture Convention (IATC), under which extradition of a person shall not
occur "when there are grounds to believe that his life is in danger, that he
will be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment.... 66
The Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions prohibit the torture of
prisoners of war 67 and civilians,68 and restrict the transfer of prisoners or
civilians to states where there is the risk of torture.69 It should be noted that
Administration lawyers and representatives of the CIA have taken the
stance that the Geneva Conventions are inapplicable to so-called "illegal
enemy combatants." 7 This view is contrary to the principle that a person
falling under the authority of a state in armed conflict is to be treated as a
prisoner of war until his status has been determined by a competent
tribunal.7" It has also been rejected at various junctures by the Department
of State72 and by members of the academic community who, amongst other
things, view this as an "exceptionalist and unilateral reinterpretation of
international law"73 which contributes to the "juridical othering" of victims
of state crimes by placing them in a legal black hole.74 The issue may be
resolved, at least at a domestic level, by the findings of the Combatant

65. Exceptions are listed in Article IF of the Convention. For example, if a person has
committed a crime, they are not considered a refugee and do not attract the protection of the
instrument. Id. art. I(F).
66. Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture art. 13, openedfor signature
Sept. 12, 1985, O.A.S. T.S. No. 67.
67. Geneva III, supra note 11, arts. 13 & 17.
68. Geneva IV, supra note 11, arts. 31 & 32.
69. Geneva III, supra note 11, arts. 12; Geneva IV, supranote 11, art. 45.
70. In a memo to the President, Presidential Counsel Alberto Gonzales advised the President
that members of both al Qaeda and the Taliban do not attract protection under Geneva III, because
they came from a "failed state" and were "not a government, but a militant, terrorist-like group."
Gonzales, supra note 36. See also Statement of Former U.S. Interrogator Bob Newman on
Australian television show Insight was quoted as saying, "[w]ell we must understand that terrorists
do not rate protection under the Geneva Conventions. Guerillas are protected because if they follow
particular rules that are involved with the Geneva Conventions, regular forces are protected. But
when it comes to the Geneva Conventions, terrorists are not." Insight: Whatever It Takes (SBS
television broadcast Apr. 5, 2005) (on file with author). The Gonzales memo ratified earlier
opinions expressed by Administration lawyers that terror suspects were neither civilians nor
prisoners of war, but were "illegal enemy combatants." See Mayer, supra note 15.
71. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on TerrorismandHumanRights,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 116, doc. 5 rev., 1 corr. 202-203 (2002). The Commission states at 203 that
this applies "whether or not the individuals are suspected to have engaged in acts of terrorism."
72. See Mayer, supra note 15.
73. Jamieson & McEvoy, supranote 2, at 505.
74. For a discussion ofjuridical othering, see Jamieson & McEvoy, supranote 2, at 517-19.
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Status Review Panel which was established by the U.S. Department of
Defense on 7 July 2004 in response to this debate."
The prohibitions contained in the ICCPR, the Refugee Convention, the
IATC, and Geneva 1I and IV vary in scope, but none are as broad as the
CAT prohibition. They are, therefore, only briefly mentioned as "fall
back" provisions, but may prove to be important if a complainant has
trouble invoking CAT provisions. This is discussed in further detail below.
B. The Attribution of Internationally Wrongful Acts to the United States
The general rule is that only breaches, which can be characterized as
acts of the state, and are therefore attributable to it, may entail state
responsibility. Customary international law views the acts of organs of
states as acts of the state.76 This is also encapsulated in ILC Article 4:
"[t]he conduct of any state organ shall be considered an act of that State
under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive,
judicial or any other functions.. ."" Extraordinary renditions are allegedly
conducted by the "Special Removal Unit"78 of the CIA, which is an organ
of the U.S. government.
Even if an activity of the Special Removal Unit is ultravires, it can be
attributed to the government. ILC Article 7 indicates that it is irrelevant to
the question of attribution whether the acts in question were commissioned
in excess of the CIA's authority or in contravention of instructions from
the executive.7 9 The international community has endorsed a broad
approach to this test, ° but it still requires that the act in question be
"within the apparent limits of its functions."'', For conduct to be outside an
organ's official capacity, it would need to be "so removed from the scope

75. Howard, supranote 24, at 198-99.
76. Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 62, 87 (Apr. 29).
77. ILC Articles, supra note 1, art. 4.
78. Mayer, supranote 15. This has also been referred to as the "Special Collection Services."
Jamieson & McEvoy, supra note 2, at 517.
79. ILC Articles, supranote 1,art. 7; Estate of Jean-Baptiste Caire (France v. Mexico), 5 R.
Int'l Arb. Awards 516,531 (1929); Thomas H. Youmans (United States v. Mexico), 4 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 110 (1926).
80. Report ofthe International Law Commission on the Work ofIts Fifty-Third Session, U.N.
GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 99-103, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Report of the
International Law Commission], availableat http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/english/a 56 10.pdf
(last visited Jan. 16, 2006).
81. Diffdrend Dame Moss6 13 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 486, 494 (1953). See also American
Bible Society Case, 6 MooRE's DIGEST § 1000, at 743.
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of their official functions that it should be assimilated to that of private
individuals, not attributable to the State. 82 Even if President Bush's public
denial that extraordinary renditions occur83 is taken to suggest that
extraordinary renditions are not authorized by the central administration,
the practice is too systematic and well resourced to be regarded as the
private vigilantism of a few "bad eggs"84 within the CIA.
A state will be responsible for an act of an official or state organ even
if a domestic law prohibits that8 5behavior, and the act therefore simply
"ought not to have occurred.
Therefore, the Torture Outsourcing
Prevention Act, a piece of legislation introduced to the U.S. House of
Representatives by Senator Edward Markey proposing to explicitly
"prohibit the transfer or return of persons by the United States, for the
purpose of detention, interrogation, trial, or otherwise, to countries where
torture or other inhuman treatment of persons occurs, 86 will not alter the
imputability for any future extraordinary renditions if it is passed.
IV. No CIRCUMSTANCES

PRECLUDING WRONGFULNESS

ARE PRESENT

The power of the executive to protect national security has been put
forward as a justification for derogating from the prohibition on torture. 7
The Office of the Legal Counsel has attempted to draw on the doctrines of
necessity and self-defense to justify breaches of human rights obligations
in the "war on terrorism."88 The invocation of these doctrines is flawed
because necessity and self-defense do not preclude wrongfulness in the
case of a peremptory human rights norm. Diplomatic assurances have also
been put forward as an excuse for extraordinary rendition. This also fails
to preclude the wrongfulness of extraordinary rendition, for the reasons
outlined in this part.

82. Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 80, at 102.
83. Gonzales, supra note 36.
84. See Howard, supra note 24, at 190.
85. GILLIAN TRIGGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW-CONTEMPORARY PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES
12 (Butterworths/Lexis Nexis) (2006).
86. H.R. 952, 109th Cong. (2005).
87. Goldman, supranote 43, at 3.
88. Id.
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A. The Non-Refoulement Obligation is a Non-Derogable
Jus Cogens Obligation
Balancing the human rights of an individual considered a security
threat, and the security interests of a nation, tends to raise conflicts
between international and domestic law. Under international law, the
prohibitions on torture and rendition to torture are non-derogable and, as
such, cannot be justified in the interests of national security. Domestic
legislation, not only in the United States but in Canada, New Zealand, and
other states, usually accepts and incorporates the standards set by
international law but creates exceptions for national security. In the United
States, aliens suspected of engaging in terrorist activity are considered a
security threat under section 241(b)(3)(B) of the Immigration and
NationalityAct8 9 and are removable from the United States regardless of

whether they will face persecution upon return because they do not rate
protection under the Code of FederalRegulations.90 New Zealand has
similar rules in its immigration legislation. 9' In Suresh v. Canada(Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration)92 and Zaoui v. Attorney General of New
Zealand,93 executive acts were considered in the light of domestic

legislation which permits national security to justify compromising the
rights of accused.
The Court in Suresh, generally supportive of thejus cogens status of
the torture prohibition, nonetheless did not rule out that "in exceptional
circumstances, deportation to face torture might be justified." 94
"Exceptional circumstances" were, of course, the threat posed by a person
to national security, which the case broadly defined. 95 The case concerned
an appeal of a decision to deport Manickavasagam Suresh, a Sri Lankan
Convention refugee, 96 whose membership of the Liberation Tigers of

89. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (1952).

90. See TORTURE BY PROXY, supra note 3, at 21.
91. Part 3 of the Immigration Act 1987 (NZ) provides for deportation ofpersons who threaten
national security or who are suspected terrorists. Immigration Act 1987, 1987 S.N.Z. No. 74 §§ 7273 (N.Z.). Under section 72, the Minister of Immigration may certify a person to be a threat to
national security, following which a deportation order can be made by Order in Council. The
Minister can also order the deportation of suspected terrorists under section 73.
92. Suresh v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3.
93. Attorney General v. Zaoui, Dec. No. CA20/04 (N.Z.C.A. Sept. 30, 2004).
94. Suresh, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3, 78.
95. Id. 82-92.
96. A refugee is defined as a person who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of
nationality or habitual residence due to a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race,
religion, political opinion, nationality, or membership in a social group.
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Tamil Eelam was considered to make him a threat to the security of
Canada.97 The decision was handed down approximately four months after
September 11, 2001, leading some to question whether the human rights
stalwarts of the Canadian Supreme Court were not immune to the postSeptember 11 heebie-jeebies.98 Suresh's appeal was nonetheless upheld,
and the Canadian Supreme Court left the underlying issue open-ended:
"[t]he ambit of an exceptional discretion to deport to torture, if any, must
await further cases." 99
The more recent case of Zaoui concerned the case of Ahmed Zaoui, a
Convention refugee in respect of whom a security certificate had been
issued by the New Zealand government.' The New Zealand Court of
Appeal dealt with how Part 4A of the ImmigrationAct 1987 (NZ), which
explicitly requires the application of provisions of the Refugee
Convention, is to be applied by government officials.'' The non-derogable
nature of the non-refoulement obligation, as evidenced by international
conventions including the Refugee Convention,10 2 was viewed not as
creating an absolute prohibition on refoulement but meaning that "the
[Refugee Convention] art 33.2 exception must be interpreted restrictively.
... [T]his means that the danger to security must be serious enough to
justify frustrating the whole purpose of the Refugee Convention by
sending a person back to persecution."'0 3 CAT, which does not make
exceptions to the prohibition on refoulement, barely rated a mention, and
appears not to guide the decision in the slightest.
Regardless of the potential ambit of the national security exception a
country's courts decide what is appropriate, the concern is that the judicial
arms of federal governments are prepared to defer to executive discretion
and support legislative reworkings of international obligations at all. This
is because the ILC Articles and General Comment 31 clearly maintain that
domestic law does not justify a breach of international law."°

97. Suresh, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3, 1.
98. E.g., John Terry, counsel for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees as intervener in
the Suresh appeal, wrote that "[t]he Supreme Court of Canada's decision would have been very
different if the events of 9/11 had not occurred before it was released." John A. Terry, Human
Rights and Security Interests: Suresh v. Canada and Its UncertainLegacy, 1 TRANSATLANTIC Q.
38, 39 (2005).
99. Suresh, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3, 78.
100. Attorney General v. Zaoui, Dec. No. CA20/04.
101. Immigration Act 1987, supra note 91, pt. 4A.
102. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 64.
103. Zaoui, Dec. No. CA20/04, 136.
104. HRC GENERAL COMMENT 31, supra note 62, 4; ILC Articles, supra note 1, art. 3.
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CAT Article 2(2) affirms that the prohibition on torture is nonderogable. It provides, "[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever,
whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any
other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture. '1O
Knowingly delivering individuals to a state sponsor of torture therefore
constitutes collaboration in commission of torture, leading to responsibility
for breaches of thejus cogens prohibition on torture.
In addition, it is now widely accepted that the absolute ban on torture
gives rise to the derivative prohibition on refoulement to torture under
customary international law °6 and that, like torture, non-refoulement is a
non-derogable jus cogens obligation. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Torture maintains that the principle ofnon-refoulement "is an inherent part
of the overall absolute and imperative nature of the prohibition of torture
and other forms of ill-treatment"0 7 and is non-derogable.' 08 In the asylum
context, the Executive Committee of the program of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees 9 has determined that the principle of nonrefoulement "is not subject to derogation."" 0 There is also some evidence
of state practice and opinio juris in support of a jus cogens
characterization. "' The CAT Committee decision in TapiaPaez v. Sweden
also implied that the prohibition is absolute:
Whenever substantial grounds exist for believing that an individual
would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon expulsion to
another State, the State Party is under obligation not to return the
person concerned to that State. The natureof the activities in which
the person concernedengagedcannot be a materialconsideration
when making a determinationunder article3 of the Convention.112
105. CAT, supra note 10, art. 2(2).
106. TORTURE BY PROXY, supranote 3, at 44 (citing a range of sources at footnote 235).
107. The Special Rapporteur, Report ofthe SpecialRapporteuron Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or DegradingTreatment or Punishment, 28, delivered to the Security Council and the
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/324 (Aug. 23, 2004).
108. Id. 31.
109. The pronouncements of the Executive Committee of the program of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees carry a great deal of weight in determining the question of whether
because it is composed of representatives from states most affected by non-refoulement-related
issues. Jean Allain, The Jus Cogens Nature ofNon-Refoulement, 13 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 533, 539
(2001).
110. U.N. High Commission for Refigees, Report ofthe Forty-FourthSession ofthe Executive
Committee of the High Commissioner'sProgrammeon the GeneralConclusion on International
Protection,U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/821 (1996).
111. Allain, supranote 109, at 539-40.
112. Tapia Paez v. Sweden, Communication No. 39/1996, 14.5, U.N. CAT/C/i 8/D/39/1996
(1997) (emphasis added).
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European international human rights jurisprudence also takes this
approach. For instance, Chahal v. United Kingdom confirms that a
potential threat to national security posed by a returnee's alleged terrorist
activities was not a relevant consideration for the purposes of determining
state responsibility for rendition to torture." 3
B. DiplomaticAssurances Are Not a Valid Excuse
The United States is not alone in claiming that obtaining a diplomatic
assurance from the country of return that the transferee will not be harmed
prevents a rendition or extradition from breaching international law. In a
string of cases discussed in Human Rights Watch briefs "Empty
Promises:"Diplomatic Assurances No SafeguardAgainst Torture"4 and
Still at Risk: Diplomatic Assurances No Safeguard Against Torture,"5
Canada, Germany, Austria, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and others
attempt to defend transfers on the basis of diplomatic assurances.
The Human Rights Watch reports argue emphatically that because of
the clandestine nature of torture, and because neither the sending nor
receiving governments have an interest in exposing a human rights abuse
arising from a rendition, diplomatic assurances cannot be relied on to
prevent torture. By its very nature, a diplomatic assurance is not a legal
safeguard: it is an unreliable, unaccountable, unenforceable diplomatic
measure. But from a state responsibility perspective, can a diplomatic
by vitiating the transferor's actual knowledge
assurance have legal effect
116
torture?
of
of the risks
The answer emanating from all quarters is in the negative. Not only is
it implausible that, as a matter of fact, the United States is unaware of the
problem of torture in receiving countries" 7 but as a matter of law. Because

113. Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 413 (1996). This was followed by Lord
Hoffman in Secretary of State. Department v. Rehman [2003] 1 A.C. 153 (H.L.).
114. H.R.W. Report 1, supra note 14.
115. H.R.W. Report 2, supra note 14.
116. Such knowledge is found in the Bureau of Human Rights, Democracy and Labor's
Human Rights Reports 1 and 2, H.R.W. Report 1, supranote 14; H.R.W. Report 2, supranote 14.
117. See James Ross, JurisdictionalAspectsoflnternationalHumanRights andHumanitarian
Law in the War on Terror, in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HuMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 9, 14

(Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga eds., 2004) [hereinafter EXTRATERRITORIAL
See also Transcript, Senate Judiciary Hearing on the Patriot Act,
APPLICATION].
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Apr. 5, 2005, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A280812005Apr5.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2007) (where U.S. Senator Patrick J. Leahy states that
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales has admitted that he was unaware of whether the promises of
recipient states were complied with).
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the prohibition on torture is absolute, "formal assurances cannot suffice
where a risk nonetheless remains.""' 8 Take the case of Chahal,1, 9 which
dealt with the equivalent European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
prohibition to CAT Article 3 20 as an example. In May 2005, in concluding
that Sweden violated CAT, the CAT Committee found the "procurement
of diplomatic assurances, which, moreover, provided no mechanism for
12
their enforcement, did not suffice to protect against this manifest risk.'
In that case the European Court of Human Rights found that a diplomatic
assurance from the Indian government was not a sufficient safeguard for
the safety of the individual given the "recalcitrant
and enduring problem"
22
of human rights abuses by its security forces.
The rejection of diplomatic assurances is indicative of a strict approach
to the "mens rea" element of state responsibility in the refoulement
context. However, the state responsibility jurisprudence available at the
time of writing does not expressly endorse a strict mens rea approach. In
the absence of a clear pronouncement on the issue in the ILC Articles, we
turn to various conflicting authorities, which have held states responsible
on the bases of strict liability, fault, negligence, intention and knowledge,
in order to discover where the non-refoulement obligation sits on the fault
continuum.
The "objective responsibility" approach of the Neer Claim' 23 and the
Roberts Claim124 is not exactly appropriate, because it finds responsibility
on the result of the actions, and a breach of Article 3 of CAT may occur
without
harm.
The CorfuCourt
Channel
Case"'(ICJ)
provides
guidance.any
In appreciable
that case, the
International
of Justice
foundmore
that

118. Report by Mr Alvara Gil-Robles, Commissionerfrom Human Rights, on His Visit to
Sweden, CommDH (2004) 19, (July 8, 2004) [hereinafter Report by Gil-Robles], available at
https://wcd.coe.int/ (type "Gil-Robles" and "Sweden" into reference box; then follow "The
Commissioner-CommDH (2004) 13/08 July 2004" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 10, 2007); The
Special Rapporteur, supra note 107, 31. U.N. Independent Expert on the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism Robert Goldman also holds this
view. Goldman, supranote 43.
119. Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413 (1996).
120. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 14,
80-88 (1989) (establishing
that a nonrefoulement obligation attaches to the Article 3 provision that "[n]o one shall be subjected
to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" giving rise to a derivative
responsibility not to extradite a person in circumstances where they may be tortured).
121. U.N. Committee Against Torture, Decision, CommunicationNo. 233/2003, 13.4, U.N.
Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (May 24, 2005).
122. Chahal,23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413 at 104-05.
123. Neerclaim (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 60 (1926).
124. Robert Claim (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 77 (1926).
125. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
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the Albanian Government ought to have known of the risk of harm to
foreign vessels moving through its waters, and was therefore bound as a
matter of humanity to warn them. 12 6 By analogy, the CIA ought to know
that there is a significant chance that a diplomatic assurance from a known
human rights violator cannot be relied on, and this knowledge is to be
imputed to the highest levels of the executive branch.'27
Unlike the Corfu Channel situation, which dealt with an omission,
extraordinary rendition is a positive act, and a tribunal would arguably take
a stricter approach than in that case.' 28 Furthermore, Special Rapporteur,
James Crawford states that the mental element "depends on the
interpretation of that rule in the light of its object or purpose."' 29 The
object of the customary international law and the relevant treaty
prohibitions is to prevent any person from being tortured abroad, and
because this rule is non-derogable, a strict approach is justified. The
bottom line for the purposes of our discussion is that, because governments
ought to know that the risk of torture exists notwithstanding a diplomatic
assurance, a diplomatic assurance is not a way of contracting out of their
fundamental non-refoulement obligations under CAT.
C. Necessity and Self-Defense Do Not Precludethe Wrongfulness of
ExtraordinaryRenditions
A state may be exculpated from responsibility for otherwise wrongful
acts when the acts are "lawful measures of self-defence, ' ' 3"O which are
proportional to the threat of armed attack and necessary to respond to it.'
Because self-defense may be anticipatory, the U.S. government would
argue that, in the light of the 9/11 attack, which has been characterized as
an armed attack,'32 there is a "reasonable belief' that further armed attacks
by terrorist organizations are imminent," and this justifies practices such
as extraordinary rendition. Such an argument would fail on at least three
126. Id.
127. "The effectiveness of international duties would be much reduced if the complainant
State had to prove some level of knowledge or intention at a high level of government in respect
of the acts or omissions of subordinate officials." Brownlie, State Responsibility and the
InternationalCourt of Justice, in ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 12.
128. TRiGGS, supra note 85, at 8.
129. Id. at 7.
130. ILC Articles, supranote 1, art. 21.
131. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14, 90 (June 27), cited
in TRIGGs, supra note 85, at 22.
132. Davis Brown, Use ofForceAgainst TerrorismAfter September1 th: State Responsibility,
Self-Defense and Other Responses, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 29 (2003).
133. Id.at 41.
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bases. First, it is unlikely that self-defense forms a valid foundation for
lawful measures taken against a terrorist organization, as opposed to a
state. 134 Next, a measure which involves the breach of a non-derogable
human right cannot be a "lawful measure." As established above, nonrefoulement is an obligation from which a state may not derogate. Finally,
sending a suspect to be tortured is not a "proportional" response to a
perceived security threat which, in reality, might or might not actually
exist.
The invocation of necessity is also flawed. ILC Article 25 states that
necessity may be invoked as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of
an act, when the act was the only way to safeguard an essential interest
against a grave and imminent peril, and it does not seriously impair the
essential interests of a state or the international community.'35 Whether the
first limb of this test-the existence of a grave and imminent peril-is
satisfied is difficult to know in the context of terrorism.' 36 Regardless of
whether there is such a threat, the second limb of the doctrine-that the act
was the only way to safeguard an essential interest-is not satisfied. In the
"'
Case Concerning the Gabeikovo-Nagymaros Project,37
Hungary's
reliance on the necessity doctrine was rejected because it could have taken
other courses which were in harmony with their international obligations
to avert the threat. 38 In the context of the "war on terror," there are other
lawful, not to mention humane, ways of dealing with suspects to avert the
threat of another 9/11:
Prohibiting the removal of someone to state sponsors of torture does
not mean that they must be released. The Supreme Court has held
that people who receive CAT protection can be held in detention if
they pose a danger to the United States. In response to the Court,
the former Immigration and Naturalization Service promulgated
regulations for determining the circumstances under which an alien
may be held in custody beyond the statutory removal period.
Pursuant to the Court's decision and the INS regulations, it is clear

134. See id. at 43.
135. ILC Articles, supra note 1, art. 25.
136. International law can be criticized for failing to address the nature of the threat of
terrorism, which differs from traditional concepts of war because by their nature they are
unexpected attacks.
137. Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
138. Id. at 46.
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that removal to state sponsors of torture is not necessary to fight
'
terrorism. 39
Necessity also fails because it "seriously impair[s] an essential interest of
the international community as a whole" by breaching an erga omnes
norm, contrary to ILC Article 25.
V. INVOKING STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS

At the time of publication, the U.S.'s program of extraordinary
rendition has well and truly entered the public consciousness. Even before
the Hollywood Film Rendition introduced the term "extraordinary
rendition" into the vocabulary of ordinary Americans, the international
community called for the practice to stop. At the 61st session of the
UNHCR, the World Organization Against Torture urged the U.S.
government to put an immediate end to the practice of extraordinary
rendition. 4 ' On February 5, 2004, Canada established a Commission of
Inquiry in relation to the involvement of Canadian officials in the rendition
of Maher Arar, the case mentioned above.' 4 ' In 2004, Sweden also
commenced an investigation into a 2001 operation in which two terror
suspects were spirited from Sweden to Egypt by the United States. 142At the
insistence of several of its own senators in February 2005, 43 the Italian
government has launched litigation in respect of the seizure and rendition
of Muslim cleric Abu Omar from Milan to Egypt for interrogation and
torture, "a totally illegal act,"'" which it insists it neither knew about nor

139. Judiciary Democrats, Dissenting Views (House of Representatives), at 249.
140. U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 61st Sess., Geneva, Switz., Mar. 14-Apr. 22,
PositionPaperof the World OrganisationAgainst Torture, at 25, availableat http://www.omct.

org/pdt/general/2005/positionpaper_2005.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2005).
141. See Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher
Arar, http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/maher-arar/07-09-13/www.
ararcommission.ca/eng/index.htm.
142. Boston.com reported in 2004 that "[t]his spring, the Swedish government launched a
series of investigations into the 2001 operation" (in which two terror suspects were transported to
Egypt from Sweden by the United States). Farah Stockman, TerrorSuspects'TortureClaims Have
Mass. Link, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 29, 2004, available at http://www.boston.com/news/world/

middleeast/articles/2004/11/29/terror suspectstortureclaims-havemass link?pg=fulI (last
visited Dec. 31, 2007); see also Report by Gil-Robles, supra note 118, 18.
143. See CHRGJ, supra note 20 (stating Cesare Salvi asked for an investigation).
144. CNN.com, supra note 34 (quoting Armando Spataro, deputy district attorney of Milan
and lead investigator in June 2005).
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approved.' Specifically, proceedings against twenty-six CIA agents and
five Italian intelligence operatives for the kidnapping of Omar were
commenced in the Milan's Palace of Justice in January 2007.46 In
addition, several individuals who have survived brutal treatment abroad
have taken
their stories to the media, and in very few instances, to local
4 7
Courts.

1

Such actions impute to the United States responsibility for the human
rights breach involved, but as far as international law is concerned, they
are merely "background noise."' 48 Diplomatic pressure, domestic criminal
actions against individual perpetrators, and public shaming do not fall
within the narrow concept of an "invocation" of state responsibility, which
would require the commencement of proceedings before an international
court, committee, or tribunal.' 49 The difficulty of invocation was
anticipated by Deputy Assistant Attorney-General John Yoo, who wrote
in 2002 that even if Administration lawyers had read international law
incorrectly in regards to the use of torture in the war against terror, "there
is no international court to review the conduct of the United States. .. ""5
This part will discuss why injured states avoid invoking state
responsibility, and why individuals and third party states-while formally
recognized as actors in the international community and theoretically
capable of invoking state responsibility-have difficulty invoking
responsibility for extraordinary renditions.

145. According to an Italian government statement, "neither the government, nor diplomatic
corps, nor the director of SISMI nor the information and security apparatus ever received any sort
of advisement from United States authorities."Id. On the other hand, U.S. intelligence officers have
intimated that such denials are false, saying that it would be nearly impossible for the operation to
have been launched without the permission of the Italian government. Tracy Wilkinson, Italian Ire
Mounts at C.I.A. KidnappingofEgyptian Imam, L.A. TiMES, June 26, 2005.
146. John Crewdson, Cleric 'sStory ofAdbduction, Torture,CHl. TRIB., Jan. 7,2007, available
at http://www.chicagotribune. com/news/nationworld/chi-070107abuomar-main-story, 1,7418553.
story.
147. See, e.g.,ArarLaunchesLawsuitAgainst U.S. Government, CBC News, http://www.cbc.
ca/news/story/2004/01/22/ararsuitO4Ol22.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
148. Evans, supra note 12, at 156.
149. Commentary to ILC Articles, art. 42, cited in Edith Brown Weiss, Invoking State
Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 798, 800 (2002).
150. Letter from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney-General, to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel
to the President, (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAi3 218, 220
(Karen Greenberg & Joshua Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE TORTURE PAPERS].
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A. Invoking State Responsibilityfor Human Rights Breaches-Locus
Standi of InternationalActors
1. The Individual
Traditionally, state responsibility could only be invoked by one state
against another state. With the advent of human rights in international law,
the Westphalian system has been adapted so as to allow an individual to
bring a complaint against his' 5 ' own state for breaching his rights.'52 The
institution of citizenship is the basis of the individual's legal relationship
with a particular state. 5 3 However, as we have seen, human rights issues
arise not only between a state and its own citizens, but between a state and
a foreign citizen. In fact, except in the case of Ahmed Ali Abu, an
American citizen allegedly held and tortured in Saudi Arabia after being
captured by U.S. security personnel in Pakistan,'54 all alleged
extraordinary renditions have involved non-U.S. citizens. This is not due
purely to the foreign nature of the terrorist threat (recent experience shows
that the danger of homegrown terrorism is as real and imminent as any
foreign threat 55 ) but a reflection of the overall policy of othering the
victim.

151. Masculine terminology is used in this Article because reported cases of extraordinary
rendition are usually against men.
152. See Evans, supra note 12, at 140; Weiss, supranote 149, at 798.
153. See Gibney et al., supra note 46, at 262-63.
154. Abu Ahmed Ali's parents have served a writ of habeas corpus in the domestic courts. His
is an atypical case of extraordinary rendition, because he was actually captured by U.S. security
forces in Pakistan, where he was studying, and placed in detention there. See Memorandum
Opinion, at 1-2, Ali v. Ashcroft, No. 04-1258 (U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia).
155. For example, the July 7, 2005 London bombings, which killed 56 people and injured
approximately 700 people, are believed to have been carried out by UK-based Islamic paramilitary
organizations. See Wikipedia, 7 July 2005 London Bombings, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/7_
July_2005_Londonbombing (describing the incident and its investigation) (as of Apr. 10, 2007,
8:31 EST). A video entitled "The War of the Oppressed People" portraying a masked man
delivering threats of terrorists attacks against the West in an Australian accent was released in
August 2005, with forensic linguist concluding that the man was Australian-born. Ian Munro &
Jesse Hogan, Terror Video Man is Australian,THE AGE, Aug. 10, 2005. Around the same time, a
taped monologue believed to have been delivered by the eldest of the four London bombers before
the attacks was published in English on Al-Jazeera satellite channel and America's ABC News
obtained a copy of a video of a man delivering threats in "a stilted American accent." Mark
Hosenball, Terrorists:Bloodcurdling Qaeda Threats-In English, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 26, 2005,
availableat http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9378357/site/newsweek/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
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In assessing the prospects for a successful claim, it is important to
notice that the practice usually involves both (1) extraterritorial human
rights breaches, and (2) human rights breaches against foreign nationals.
As the case of L6pez Brugos v. Uruguay shows, the extraterritoriality
of a human rights violation is not a bar to state responsibility.'56 This case
involved an application under the ICCPR by the wife of a citizen of
Uruguay who was allegedly captured in Argentina by Uruguayan security
and intelligence forces and detained in Buenos Aires for two weeks, before
being transported back to Uruguay and eventually arrested. The Human
Rights Committee (HRC) held that:
Article 2(1) of the Covenant places an obligation upon a State party
to respect and to ensure rights "to all individuals within its territory
and subject to its jurisdiction," but... [it] ...does not imply that
the State party concerned cannot be held accountable for violations
of rights under the Covenant which its agents commit upon the
territory of another State.'57
The court's finding in that case that the violation came under the ICCPR
rested heavily upon the relationship between the citizen and the state.'58
This is a relationship that extraterritoriality does not sever. As Tomuschat
comments, it would be absurd if an interpretation of the ICCPR and the
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR were to grant a state "unfettered
the
discretionary power to carry out willful and deliberate attacks against
' 59
abroad."'
living
citizens
their
[of]
integrity
freedom and personal
If Brugos had been victim to the actions of a foreign government,
according to HRC General Comment 31 the nature of the obligation would
be unchanged:
a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the
Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that
State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State
Party. As indicated in General Comment 15 adopted at the twenty-

156. Sergio Euben Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Communication No. R12/52, U.N. Doc. Supp.
No. 40 (A/36/40). See Dominick McGoldrick, InternationalApplication of the International
Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION, supra note 117, at
47.
157. Burgos, Communication No. 12/52, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) 12.3.
158. Id. 12.2.
159. McGoldrick, in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION, supra note 117, at 62.
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seventh session (1986), the enjoyment of Covenant rights is not
limited to citizens of States Partiesbut must also be availableto all
individuals, regardless of nationality or statelessness, such as
asylum seekers, refugees, migrant workers and other persons, who
may find themselves in the territory or subject to the jurisdiction of
the State Party. 60
Standing to enforce a foreign government's obligation is more
problematic. Individual claims against foreign governments can only be
made under an instrument specifically conferring on an individual locus
standito do so. CAT provides that the CAT Committee can form "views"
on complaints forwarded to it by individuals against a state which has
made an Article 22 declaration giving it jurisdiction to do SO,' 6 ' and the
ICCPR gives a similar jurisdiction to the HRC, but the United States has
refused the CAT Committee and the HRC jurisdiction over complaints
lodged by individuals. 162 The only forum that has jurisdiction to hear an
individual claim against the United States is the Inter-American
Commission and Court on Human Rights. 63 This court's screening
process, which has resulted in just over 25 cases out of 12,000 complaints
being heard, 6" makes a successful application a distant prospect.
Foreign victims of international human rights breaches have
successfully brought civil actions in American domestic courts under
certain federal legislation. Because the prohibition of torture is a "specific,
universal and obligatory" norm, a foreign individual could file a claim
against a government official or a private military firm under the Alien
166
Tort ClaimsAct (ACTA) 161 or the Torture Victim ProtectionAct (TVPA)
in respect of a rendition. The El-Masri case is one example of this. This
form of redress offers the advantage of assisting a victim to gain
160. HRC GENERAL COMMENT 31, supra note 62, 10 (emphasis added).
161. CAT, supra note 10, art. 22.
162. Office ofthe U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Declarations and Reservations,
availableat http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cat-reserve.htm; see TORTURE BY PROXY, supra
note 3, at 33 n.177.
163. The United States has signed but not ratified the American Convention on Human Rights.
ACHR, supra note 11. Article 44 confers jurisdiction on the Inter-American Court to hear claims
by an individual against a State Party to the Convention. Id. Because the United States has not
ratified the Convention, the Commission would examine a claim under the American Declaration
on the Rights and Duties of Man. See TORTURE BY PROXY, supra note 3, at 101.
164. TRIGGs, supra note 85, Draft Chapter on Dispute Resolution, at 49 (citing Sands &
Klein).
165. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992).
166. Id. Section 2 of the TVPA states: "(a) Liability. An individual who, under actual or
apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation--(1) subjects an individual to torture
shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual..."
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compensation and begin to rebuild his life, but because a claim can be
brought only against a natural person or a corporation, and cannot be
brought against the United States as a state, this enables the U.S.
Administration to maintain distance between itself and the "othered"
perpetrator. This is essentially a side issue because, as a domestic civil
action, ATCA and TVPA proceedings fall short of an invocation of state
responsibility, which needs to be in an international forum.
An individual does not have the opportunity to challenge the legality
of his removal prior to it occurring because he is spirited away without
warning and held incommunicado whilst in transit. International
procedural law empowers international dispute resolution mechanisms to
request the application of "interim measures" by a government when there
is a risk that return may result in irreparable harm to the rights claimed by
a petitioner.' 67 In Shamayev and 12 Others v. Georgiaand Russia,168 the
European Court of Human Rights requested that the Georgian Government
delay the extradition to Russia of thirteen Chechens who had allegedly
illegally crossed the border into Georgia, until the Court had time to
review the men's cases. 169 Unlike extraditions, which involve a formal
application process, extraordinary renditions are occur off-the-record and
outside the law; individuals are removed swiftly and silently without the
chance to seek an order for interim measures from an international
tribunal.
2. The Injured State
A victim of extraordinary rendition could petition his government to
invoke state responsibility as an injured state under ILC Article 42.170 In
practice, states rarely respond to such requests.' 7 ' It is completely at the
discretion of the state whether to invoke responsibility, and in many cases,
there are innumerable reasons not to invoke responsibility, including aid
reliance. 7 2 Taking the United States to task in relation to the manner in
167. See H.R.W. Report 1, supranote 14, at 24.
168. Shamayev and 12 Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2005-11I Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
169. See Press Release, Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, Interim measures
in case of Shamayev and 12 Others v. Georgia and Russia (Oct. 10, 2002), available at
www.echr.coe.int/eng/press/2002/oct/chechensvgeorgia%26russia.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
Requests for interim measures are not always successful in preventing a wrong from occurring.
170. ILC Articles, supranote 1, art. 42.
171. TORTURE BY PROXY, supra note 3, at 100 n.586.
172.
The United States cut US $70 million aid to Yemen when it voted against the United States in the
Security Council Resolution 678 in 1990, relating to the legitimation of Operation Desert Storm.
Michael Byers & Simon Chesterman, Changing the Rules about Rules?, in
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559

which it prosecutes the war on terror may be viewed, of course oversimplistically, as an endorsement of the activities of terrorist groups.
Situations where an individual is rendered to torture in his country of
citizenship is even more problematic. It would be absurd if Egypt for
example was to bring an action against the United States for facilitating a
human rights breach Egypt committed against its own citizen.
Australia may not view itself as such, but it is an injured state.
Australian citizen Mumdouh Habib alleges that he was a victim of
extraordinary rendition when in 2001, he was delivered by the CIA to
Egypt where he was tortured for six months before being transferred to
Guantdnamo Bay.' Does the Australian government have the political
will to render the United States accountable for the refoulement of its
citizen Mumdouh Habib? Probably not, given its hands-off approach to the
Guantfinamo Bay detention and potentially illegal military trial of
Australian terror suspect David Hicks, in spite of public concern. 17 4 What
about other injured states? The Canadian government would be the most
likely to take action, as a financially independent, clearly anti-terrorist and
pro-human rights nation, which has shown its preparedness to meet the
United States in the courtroom over international legal issues in the past.'75
It remains to be seen whether Canada will attempt to bring the Maher Arar
case before the ICJ or make an Article 21 communication to CAT.
3. A "Non-Injured" State
Given the extreme difficulties of having an action brought by the
citizen's state, it may be more plausible for states other than the injured
state to engage the state responsibility of the offending state. This is
known as "inter-State responsibility" and is allowed under ILC Article 48

ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 177, 192 (J.L.
Holzgrete & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 2003).
173. Dana Priest & Dan Eggen, TerrorSuspect Alleges Torture, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A51726-2005Jan5.html.
174. Public sentiment has been expressed in various forms. See, e.g., Welcome to "Fair Go
for David," http://www.fairgofordavid.org, (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
175. However, disputes between the two countries have tended to relate to economic or
environmental interests rather than human rights. See, e.g., Trail Smelter (United States v. Can.),
3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938 & 1941); Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area
(Can. v. United States), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12). Numerous disputes between Canada and the
United States have been adjudicated in the World Trade Organization dispute settlement body,
including the U.S.-CanadaSoftwood Lumber Case, which was resolved in 2005. Panel Report on
United States-Investigationof the InternationalTrade Commission in Softwood Lumber from
Canada,Recourse byArticle 21.5 of the DSUby Canada,WT/DS277/RW, circulated on Nov. 15,
2005.
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
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and the Barcelona Traction Case.'76 Article 48 provides that "[a]ny State
other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of
another State . . . if: . . . the obligation breached is owed to the
international community as a whole,"' 7 7 including individuals. 7 ' The
prohibition against torture and refoulement to torture is owed erga
omnes."7 9 HRC General Comment strongly endorses the invocation of
inter-state responsibility: "[w]hile article 2 is couched in terms of the
obligations of State Parties towards individuals as the right-holders under
the Covenant every State Party has a legal interest in the performance by
every other State Party of its obligations."' °
Theoretically, a third state could invoke the responsibility of the United
States for its breaches, but again, theory and practice diverge. Barcelona
Tractionand subsequent cases 8 ' have removed the legal obstacles for third
party enforcement of erga omnes norms erected by the South Western
Africa cases1 1 2 but failed to address practical problems, including the lack
of impetus and the jurisdiction of relevant international courts and
tribunals. There has been a "complete failure of States to take advantage
of the machinery provided for in the U.N. human rights instruments to
bring inter-State claims."'8 3 Where inter-state responsibility has been
invoked, it has hitherto been done for political or economic reasons, and
not purely to uphold the principles of international law.' 84 In the unlikely
event that a third state attempts to invoke inter-state responsibility, it
would probably be a state from which a person has been abducted. Such
a country finds itself simultaneously affronted at having had its
sovereignty undermined, and in danger of being accused of failing to

176. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32
(Feb. 5).
177. ILC Articles, supra note 1, art. 48(1)(b).
178. TRIGGS, supranote 85, at 38.
179. Bassiouni, supra note 43, at 68-75.
180. HRC General Comment 31, supranote 62, 2.
181. The existence of the erga omnes norm of self-determination was recognized in East
Timor. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 102 (June 30) (confirming the erga omnes
character of rights and obligations). Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo), 1996 I.C.J. 595, 616 (July 11).
182. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Aft., Liber. v. S. Aft.), 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 1966). By a
narrow majority, the ICJ held that there was no customary international law equivalent of actio
popularis. Id. at 46. A state must have a "real and existing individual interest which is legally
protected" in order to have locus standi.South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Aft.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1962
I.C.J. 319, 454 (Dec. 21).
183. Evans, supra note 12, at 147 n.29.
184. Id.
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practice due diligence to prevent the disappearance of the individual in
question, as mentioned previously in this Article. International proceedings
are but one mode of attempting to clarify a state's stance on the matter. As
mentioned above, the Italian reaction to this situation has been to bring
criminal proceedings against individual agents.
B. Invoking State Responsibility-Practicaland ProceduralDifficulties
1. Admissibility
International courts impose several admissibility requirements," 5 of
which the availability of sufficient evidence is briefly flagged as a difficult
one here.
Individuals are subjected to the juridical othering mentioned in the
introduction. They are "ghost detainees" whose cases are undocumented"8 6
and whose existence is denied.8 7 A testimonial account by a victim
retelling what was done to them will, due to the clandestine nature of the
practice, be likely to go unsupported, with the possible exception of a
traceable collection of mobile telephone calls, credit card transactions and
hotel tabs, like the ones reportedly used as evidence in the indictment of
CIA operatives by Milan prosecutors in the Abu Omar case.'88
If a potential complainant utilized the Freedom of InformationAct,'89
pursuant to which he would have access to CIA documents not
suppressible subject to national security privileges (under the CIA
InformationAct' the operational records of the CIA's Office of Security
and Directorate of Operations are exempt from the Freedom of
Information Act), it may be that sufficient evidence to execute a right to
invoke state responsibility simply does not exist. Unlike the better
documented activities of state organs (and private military firms) in
relation to Abu Ghraib and Guantfnamo Bay, the activities of the Special
Removals Unit are completely off the books. A thick cloud of secrecy
obfuscates extraordinary renditions, and as yet, no U.S. government
memos have entered the public domain that could back a claim of direct
authorization "from the top." It is quite possible that the U.S.
185.
national,
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

In general, for a claim to admissible in an international tribunal, the claim must be
local remedies must be exhausted, and there must be sufficient evidence of the breach.
Jamieson & McEvoy, supra note 2, at 517.
See Jamieson & McEvoy, supra note 2, at 518.
See CNN.com, supra note 34.
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2002).
50 U.S.C. § 431 (2004).
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Administration has purposefully chosen extraordinary rendition as a
way of prosecuting the war on terror without leaving an incriminating
"paper trail"' 9 ' such as the one evident in The Torture Papers.92 In this
fashion, an evidentiary black hole is created, adding another hurdle to the
path of a potential complainant.
2. Jurisdictional Constraints
The new paradigm has seen the swelling of U.S. government executive
power and, conversely, the inaccessibility of domestic or international
judicial review.' 93 Government memoranda reveal that security strategies,
including extraordinary rendition, were designed with the aim of depriving
the federal court ofjurisdiction over the subject matter.'94 Similarly, it was
carefully noted that certain wrongs were beyond the reach of international
dispute mechanisms such as the ICJ and CAT Committee. 95
Since the United States revoked its general consent to the jurisdiction
of the ICJ, 196 it would be necessary to gain the consent of the United States
for the ICJ to adjudicate a claim against it. 7 In practice, jurisdiction by
special agreement only arises in territorial disputes,'98 presenting an

191. Anthony Lewis, Introduction, in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 150, at xiii.
192. Id.
193. See Howard, supra note 24, at 194.
194. See Memorandum from Patrick Philbin & John Yoo on Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over
Aliens Held in Guantanimo Bay, Cuba to William J Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of
Defense (Dec. 28, 2001), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supranote 150 ("If a federal district court were
to take jurisdiction over a habeas [corpus] petition, it could review the constitutionality of the
detention and the use of a military commission, the application of certain treaty provisions, and
perhaps even the legal status of al Qaeda and Taliban members."), quoted in Howard, supranote
24, at 193.
195. See Howard, supra note 24, at 202.
196. The United States revoked its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction under the Statute of
the ICJ article 36(2) when Nicaragua made an application to the ICJ against it. Frederic L. Kirgis,
International Law Aspects of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, http://www.asil.org/insights/
2005/10/insights051004.html.
197. Under the Statute of the ICJ article 36(1), the ICJ has jurisdiction over "all cases which
the parties refer to it." Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36(1) [hereinafter Statute of
the ICJ].
198. Cases that have been referred to the ICJ pursuant to special agreement are usually
territorial disputes. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20)
(relating to a dispute as to the sovereignty of disputant states over a common continental shelf
between the states); Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17); Sovereignty
over Pedra Branca/Lulau Batus Puteh (Malay. v. Sing.), 2003 I.C.J. 146 (Sept. 1); Sovereignty over
Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), 2002 I.C.J. 625 (Dec. 17) (involving disputes
regarding the sovereignty over nearby islands to the disputant states).
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unrealistic option. A unilateral application would also require the consent
of the United States to be heard' 99 -another unlikely prospect. Treaties
may specifically provide for the jurisdiction of the ICJ over certain
questions,2 °0 but the relevant treaties-CAT, ICCPR, the Refugee
Convention and the Geneva Conventions-do not.
Because conventional routes towards ICJ jurisdiction are blocked, we
turn to alternative paths: proceedings which may not bind the United
States directly but which would publicize the issue.
First, a third state could attempt to go ahead with a case in the absence
of the United States, but the credibility of such a proceeding-already
questionable in cases such as Tehran Hostages where a directly affected
party was present 2 '-would be almost nil given that neither the injured
state nor the "defendant" state would be present. Second, a complainant
state could choose a different defendant by bringing proceedings against
a receiving state for acts of torture, thereby indirectly raising the issue of
extraordinary rendition. Egypt, for example, has accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ, 20 2 but in other cases, consent to ICJ jurisdiction
would be required. Thirdly, concerned states can lobby the U.N. Human
Rights Committee or the General Assembly to seek an advisory opinion
from a court, 213 which could be done against the wishes of the United
States. 2' An advisory opinion has been made to determine the question of
state responsibility for environmental damage in Legality of the Threat or

199. Such consent may be expressed or implied by the conduct of the "defendant" state. See
TRIGGS, supra note 85, ch. 15.

200. Statute of the ICJ, supra note 197, art. 36(1); see Military & Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. United States), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 426-29.
201. Tehran Hostages (United States v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
202. On the condition of reciprocity. See International Court of Justice, Declarations
Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court, www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicdeclarations.htm.
203. The ICJ may offer an advisory opinion on "any legal question at the request of whatever
body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such
a request" under article 65(1) of the Statute of the ICJ. Statute of the ICJ, supranote 197, art. 65(1).
Only the General Assembly or the Security Council, or a U.N. organ approved by the General
Assembly to hold this right, may seek an advisory opinion. Id. art. 96. Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 95 (July 8) is an example of the Court using
its advisory jurisdiction to offer an opinion on a substantive question of law.
204. See generallyApplicability ofArticle VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges
& Immunities of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1989 I.C.J. 177 (Dec. 15) (went ahead
without the consent of Romania, and the Western Sahara case went ahead despite the protestations
of Spain).
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Use ofNuclear Weapons °5 and for the Israeli construction of a wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory in the Israeli Wall case.206
Because remedies cannot be granted against the United States by a
court in the above three types of proceedings, the ability and willingness
of a court to make a free-standing finding of state responsibility in the
human rights context is vital. Such a finding would make it clear that the
United States cannot bypass state responsibility and prevent the
international community attributing human rights abuses to it by othering
perpetrators and victims of torture.2" 7
C. State Responsibility andInternationalHuman
Rights-Incompatibleor Unconnected?
Extraordinary rendition is one example of how globalization creates
opportunities for states to attempt to obfuscate responsibility for human
rights abuses by "outsourcing" them.20 8 In the words of M~gr~t, "[we are
witnessing the emergence of] a global network of loosely interconnected
security apparati which are profoundly redrawing the boundaries of the
law of deportation and extradition, with the blessing of panic-stricken
liberal states and only-too-happy-to-oblige illiberal ones."20 9 This global
security network, with the world's sole superpower at its center, challenges
the traditional concept that the international community is made up of
separate, discrete, independent states. It challenges the monolithic concept
of the state by facilitating indirect, collaborative, and proxy human rights
breaches. It widens the range of ways in which perpetrators and victims
can be othered. This form of international order amplifies the importance
of a direct finding of state responsibility for breaches of international
human rights. The invocation of state responsibility by bringing a state
before an international court or tribunal is imperative.
However, do the difficulties outlined above mean that it is
inappropriate to attempt to apply the general rules of international law on

205. Legality of the Threat of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 95 (July 8).
206. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).
207. See Higgins, Issues of State ResponsibilityBefore the InternationalCourt ofJustices, in
ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 7.
208. For example, could a state, which purports to condemn the death penalty, outsource
capital punishment by having its own citizens arrested in a foreign country where the death penalty
is practiced?
209. Frrddric Mrgret, Justice in Times of Violence 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 327, 343 (2003).
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state responsibility to situations involving breaches of human rights?21°
" ' but the majority opinion amongst
Some would say that this is the case,21
academics'22 and decision-makers is that the human rights context is one

in which state responsibility can be invoked. In the Rainbow Warrior
case,2" 3 the U.N. Secretary-General, acting as arbitrator, stated "any
violation by a State of any obligation, of whatever origin, gives rise to
State responsibility"2' 14 and the ICJ in Gabekovo-Nagymaros Project"5
stated that "when a State has committed an internationally wrongful act,
its international responsibility is likely to be involved whatever the nature
of the obligation it has failed to respect.' '216 The ILC Articles also
expressly countenance the impact of human rights on state
responsibility. 217 Barriers to state responsibility for human rights breaches
are certainly not due to a lack of theoretical support.
This said, should it be conceded that, from a human rights perspective,
"state responsibility ILC-style, 21 1 is better adapted to promulgating moral
standards in relation to international human rights, rather than enabling
actual enforcement? It is true that the obligations binding on states under
primary rules such as those in CAT and the ICCPR have not yet
"connected" sufficiently with the secondary obligations enunciated by the

210. Andrew Clapham, Professor of Public International Law at the Graduate Institute of
International Studies in Geneva, is cited as saying that the general rules of international law on state
responsibility "should not be... considered appropriate" in convention instruments. European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 5, 1950, E.T.S.
No. 5, cited in Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, The Doctrine of State Responsibility as a Potential
Means of Holding PrivateActors Accountablefor Human Rights, 5 MELB. J. INT'L L. 1,9 (2004).
Andrew Clapham, The "Drittwirkungof the Convention, " in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 163, 170 (Franz Mutscher, R. St. John Macdonald and Herbert
Petzold eds., 1993), quotedin Danwood Mzikerge Chirwa, The Doctrine ofStateResponsibility as
a PotentialMeans of HoldingPrivateActions Accountablefor Human Rights, 5 MELB. J. INT'L L.
1, 9 (2004).
211. Chirwa, supra note 210, at 9. Dominic McGoldrick, State Responsibility and the
InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, in ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra
note 1, at 162-63 (discussing the difficulties of finding where human rights fit into the principle of
state responsibility).
212. For example, Nicola Jagers, Viljam Engstrom, Celina Romany, and Danwood Mzikenge
Chirwa. See Chirwa, supra note 210, at 9; see also Gibney et al., supra note 46; Evans, supra note
12, at 144.
213. New Zealand v. France 20 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 217 (1990).
214. Id. at251.
215. Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
216. Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
217. ILC Articles, supra note 1, art. 50(1)(a) (providing that countermeasures must not affect
obligations for the protection of human rights); see Evans, supra note 12, at 142.
218. Evans, supra note 12, at 158.
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ILC Articles." 9 What I mean by this is that a clear breach of primary rules
contained in treaties and customary international law, such as
extraordinary rendition, for which a state is theoretically responsible under
the principles, does not translate into the legal consequences posited by the
ILC Articles. Put simply, extraordinary rendition shows us that the United
States has-through the othering of perpetrator and victim-managed to
commit a grave breach of a fundamental human right without judicial
scrutiny.
The lack of connection between primary human rights rules and
secondary rules, due to procedural issues such as standing, leaves a legal
black hole so to speak into which individuals like Mumdouh Habib may
be thrown without the repercussions naturally flowing from a human rights
breach. It makes room for the leaders of so-called liberal states to plan and
engage in state practice with greater attention to secondary rules, which
govern the consequences of primary rules, rather than the obligations to
which they are bound by the primary rules. The purpose of authoritative
human rights and humanitarian instruments will continue to be subverted
by security strategies which, despite being quite illegal, are nonetheless
assured of legal impunity.
Making the connection between human rights and state responsibility
will require not only the continued evolution of secondary rules, but also
a shift or even an expansion in the way that we deal with these primary
rules, particularly with regard to procedural matters. For instance, the rules
of standing, which currently emphasize the relationship between a citizen
and his state of citizenship, could be rethought in order to adapt to the
reality of interstate human rights breaches. The international community
should strive to achieve this, rather than settling for a diluted concept of
state responsibility for international human rights.
VI. CONCLUSION

The ILC Articles establish a sound theoretical framework for state
responsibility, but since procedural barriers prevent enforcement, do they
really "facilitate the holding to account of those who are responsible for
breaching international obligations"?22 °
The invocation of an international human right is virtually impossible.
Unless an individual is "fortunate" enough to be a victim at the hands of
his state of nationality, giving him a right to personally invoke his rights,

219. McGoldrick, in ISSUES OF STATE
220. Evans, supra note 12, at 140.
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or to be a citizen of a country willing to take up his case, he has no
recourse to justice against a state that has rendered him to torture. As an
ergaomnes norm owed to the international community at large, third states
could respond by attempting to invoke responsibility. The feasible options
available to third states, however, are not true invocation of state
responsibility, and there is insufficient impetus for inter-state
responsibility in the enforcement of human rights.
With this situation in mind, let us return to the idea expressed in ILC
Article 1 that "[e]very internationally wrongful act of a State entails the
international responsibility of that State."22 ' Is this overly optimistic? The
use of the word "entails" indicates some inevitable consequence, but the
extraordinary rendition context shows us that being able to invoke state
responsibility where a wrong is made out is anything but certain. The
principles and practice of state responsibility are not yet well connected
enough in the enforcement of human rights to enable the invocation of the
international responsibility for every internationally wrongful act. The
future is likely to see the continued international cooperation between
states to address the threat of terrorism. A system of primary and
secondary responsibility that correctly recognizes the responsibility of
individual states participating in and using this security network, and
facilitates the prosecution of breaches in international forums, is needed
to close up the legal black holes which currently allow international crime
by proxy to go unrecognized.

221. ILC Articles, supranote 1, art. 1.
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